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DCE-389

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Assistant Director for Special Operations DATE: 6 July 50

FROM : Chief, Contact Division, OS

SUBJECT: Colonel KUSHAL (Kussal) FRANSISEA

REFERENCE: DCE 211

2474 det 120 295
minsk

1. Attached hereto as enclosure A are the answers to the questions contained in your memo dated 22 June 1950, same subject.

2. Colonel KUSHAL is presently in New York City and is available for further interrogation.

for LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK

Attachment

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy ☐

(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒

(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2004, 2005

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Enclosure A - Liaison Mission to Byelorussian Partisans

1. Through the medium of Nicola Abramchik, ^{DE 241} ~~CO~~ was put in touch with Colonel (General) Francisak Kushal (Kushal); a Byelorussian of 55 years of age who since World War II, has been living in Munich, Germany.

2. During his residence in Munich, Kushal was in contact with Captain Soltis (Zoltis?) of CIC, Regensburg, through two Ukrainian intermediaries by the names of Semultin and Major Zvaritchuk. = WARYCZUK

3. In May 1948, Kushal dispatched two young Byelorussian patriots to their homeland to establish contact with local partisan groups and to bring back a member of the partisan organization. This mission was initiated with the knowledge of CIC to establish continued liaison between the partisans and Kushal.

4. The two following men were dispatched:

- A. (Fnn) Monitch (Monic), who used the cover names of Matelevski and Duga for the purposes of his mission. Monitch was born in Lubcha (Lubcz) near Novo Grodek in Byelorussia. He is about 27 years of age. He was educated in a DP gymnasium for Byelorussians at Michelsdorf near Regensburg.
- B. (Fnn) Kananovitch, who used the cover name of Yankovski for purposes of his mission. He is about 27 and was born and raised near Baranovicze.

5. Monitch and Kananovitch did not know each other. After accepting the undertaking of this mission, both left as Polish repatriates and were sent first of all to the Repatriation Camp at Lauf, near Muernberg. Limited financial aid was extended to them by Kushal.

6. Nothing was heard from Kananovitch until March 1950, at which time Kushal received a letter from him, postmarked Gdansk (Danzig). In this letter Kananovitch stated that he was returning "home". Inasmuch as Kananovitch has not returned to Munich, Kushal assumes he has gone to Byelorussia for continuance of his mission.

7. Monitch returned to Western Germany in December 1949 and gave an account of his trip to Kushal, of which the following is a resume:

Monitch was taken from Lauf to a Polish repatriation camp at Cziedzice (phonetic). At this camp he was screened by the Polish Secret Police. During this screening he was photographed and fingerprinted, and afterwards released with a certificate giving him legal status as a repatriate. In this camp and previously, Monitch declared he had been born in Bialystok and was going there to look for his mother.

Monitch spent only a few days in Bialystok as he was afraid that local police authorities would demand that he register.

Upon leaving Bialystok, he went to Siemiatice (phonetic) near the Byelorussian (USSR) border and at this place he presented himself to an Orthodox

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Priest. [How Monitch contacted this priest was not recalled by Kushal.] The date at this time was August 1948. After a few days, the priest turned Monitch over to a peasant named Kananchuk who, although not a partisan, had contact with the partisans. Kananchuk took Monitch to his house and that night brought in an active partisan.

Monitch and the partisan left Kananchuk's house under cover of darkness and crossed the Polish-Soviet frontier. It took the two men about two hours to cross the frontier using the most difficult terrain as their path. About 10 kilometers east of the frontier, Monitch was blindfolded by his companion and led to an underground shack in a deep forest. At this shack, Monitch was interrogated for a lengthy period of time. He said he had been sent by Kushal to meet General Vityushka, nominal military leader of the Byelorussian partisans. He was forced to tell all he knew about Kushal and his wife to establish his bona fides. The man who was interrogating Monitch would ask a question, leave, and then return, giving the impression that he was in radio contact with Vityushka [or had the GI's].

After the conversation was over, Monitch was blindfolded, led out of the forest and taken back across the border to Kananchuk's house, where he was told to wait for further developments.

While staying with Kananchuk, Monitch got a job on the railroad and went via rail to Nowogrodek as a stowaway. The route followed was the railroad from Bialystok to Baranovice, thence north to Nowojelnia and on to Nowogrodek. He went from Nowogrodek to Lubcha (Lubcz), his birthplace. At Lubcha he was led by old neighbors of his to the partisan group of Malibeki in the forest of Nieleboszkaya Pustcha.

The chief of the partisans of this area went under the name of Malanka; however, Monitch was met by a Dr. Bardenovic, who had been a medical officer under Kushal. He also met a Major Dub, who was an ex-officer under Kushal and gained the complete confidence of both these men. At various times Monitch was promised a meeting with Vityushka, but this never materialized.

Upon his departure from this group, Monitch was told that he was to be accompanied back to Germany by a trusted partisan company commander named Major Kalka. In all, Monitch had spent about five to six months on USSR territory.

The two men made the trip to Poland on foot, bypassing all main roads and communication points. After reaching Polish territory, they took a train and got as far as the newly-acquired western Polish territory. At a railroad station, Kalka was arrested by the Polish police, apparently after having been recognized by former members of the Armia Krajowa who had been transferred to the Polish police. There is no further record of Kalka. Monitch escaped and at this point destroyed a letter and a photograph which the partisans had entrusted to him for delivery to Kushal.

Shortly after Kalka's arrest and in another town Monitch, himself, was arrested as a vagrant and given a six months' prison term. After serving his sentence, he was sent to work at a kolkhoz near the Polish-German border. The head of this kolkhoz was a notorious black marketeer who enlisted the services of Monitch as one of his sales agents. Through the medium of this kolkhoz chief, Monitch was able to cross the Polish-German border and get to the US sector of Berlin in December 1948.

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Monitch reported to CIC in Berlin and was put in a refugee camp. He was taken out of this camp by a US Colonel named Schtcherbin [Cherbin] and upon his insistence to see Kushal, Zvoritchuk came to see him. Later Zvoritchuk and US authorities took Monitch to Munich, where he still resides.

Monitch provided Kushal with satisfactory evidence that he had been in Poland, in a Polish prison and working in a kolkhoz. He also was able to pick out and name several people that Kushal knew were definitely members of partisan groups in Byelorussia from photographs in Kushal's possession. Kushal is 100% satisfied that Monitch met the partisans and stayed with them.

8. Based upon Monitch's account, Kushal has concluded that the Byelorussian partisans under Vitushka's command are split into the following main geographic groups:

- A. The Vitebsk group, with the strongest concentration near Lepel, is under the direct personal command of General Vitushka.
- B. The Polesian Marsh group north of Pinsk is led by one Sakha (a pseudonym; a former 1st Lt. Lutskovic, personally known to Kushal, was recognized by Monitch and may, in fact, be identical with "Sakha").
- C. The Naliboki group north of Novo Godek is under the command of one Malanka. Presumably, the Polesian Marsh and Naliboki groups are in touch with Vitushka through radio communication.

Each of the three partisan groups mentioned above has two main elements: The SVS (Special Information Service) is the intelligence arm of the partisan groups. The Chorni Kot (Black Cat) is the action unit charged with paramilitary tasks, including sabotage.

Monitch passed on to Kushal the partisans' message, according to which they are well supplied with German and Soviet weapons and even have sufficient ammunition for the foreseeable future. Their main shortages occur in the field of medical supplies, and there is no hope of obtaining enough even for their most urgent needs, as the Soviets themselves are desperately short of medical supplies, at least in the BSSR. (Bandages may be purchased for as high as 500 rubles each.)

The partisans have ten radio sets in their possession. Monitch has no details on this important matter and apparently failed to inquire further.

9. In 1948, the partisans planned a major scheme in the area of Baranovitsze. They attacked the airport near Baranovitsze in an attempt to steal several planes with which to send emissaries to Western Europe. The Soviets were prepared for this attack and inflicted serious losses upon the partisans; Vitushka was wounded in the arm. Although the partisans had enlisted the cooperation of several Soviet officers for their scheme, it was betrayed to faithful Soviet authorities, apparently by members of the former Armiya Malova. (When Poland had to cede territory east of the Curzon Line to the USSR, about 2,500 members of the AK under Lupaishka elected to remain on USSR territory and to subordinate themselves to Byelorussian partisan command; some security problems have arisen to the partisans from that because of the collaboration of other former AK

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personnel in Poland with the new regime.)

Since the debacle at Baranovicze, the Byelorussian partisans have attempted to tighten their security and to reorganize in smaller cells. No major military actions have been undertaken since that time, and the partisans have been preoccupied with the training of cadres.

10. Kushal believes that the partisan movement in Byelorussia has a considerable potential both for immediate intelligence purposes and for military purposes in case of an East-West conflict because Byelorussia lies astride the main supply route for Soviet troops in the West. He is convinced that contact with them would be of great importance for the US. He suggests that Monitch and additional personnel should be carefully briefed and dispatched to the BSSR. One of the short-range purposes of such a mission would be the establishment of radio communication with the partisans, for which they are naturally eager and perhaps even prepared. In furtherance of long-range plans, he proposes to enlist up to one hundred young Byelorussian patriots from among the groups supporting Abramtchik to be sent to the BSSR in time of war, as cadres both for intelligence and paramilitary purposes. For any such plans, close liaison between Abramtchik and himself and the proper US authorities is a prerequisite as the operation should be completely under US direction; training in modern partisan warfare, in intelligence methods, etc. would have to be extended to personnel charged with these tasks. The continental US affords the only logical security protection for such a program, in Kushal's opinion. [We believe that this view is subject to correction.]

11. The above information is based upon a fairly intensive interrogation, during which spontaneous observations on the part of Kushal were augmented through repeated questioning. On the mission of Monitch, in particular, certain details are not now available to Kushal and would presumably have to be obtained indirectly. Kushal, however, will be available for additional interrogation.

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